Introduction
C onmet classification has been and will continue to be one of the most complex issues arising from the intersection of national security policy and internationallaw. From the inception of what the United States dubbed the "Global War o n Terror," experts have been debating the meaning of the term "armed confli ct," both international and non -international. The proliferation of remotely piloted warfare has only exacerbated the uncertainty associated with the meaning of these terms. In response, the concept of self-defense targeting emerged as an ostensible alternative to determining if and when a national llsear armed force qualified as an armed conflict. In essence, this theory averts the need to engage in jus in bello l classification of counterterror military operations by relying on the overarchingjus ad bellum 2 legal justification for these o perations. Self-defense targeting, or what Professor Ken neth Anderson has called "naked self-defense,") is offered as the U.S. legal fra m ework for employing com bat power to destroy or disrupt the capabilities Blurring the Line between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello of transnational terrorist o peratives. 4 This essay will q uestion the validity of substitutingjus ad bellutn principles for those of the jus in bello, and why this substitution is a false solution to this extremely complex conflict classification dilemma.
The attack on Osama Bin Laden's (OBL) com pound in Pakistan S has exposed in stark relief the importance of defining the legal framework applicable to the use of military force as a counterterrorism tool. The initial focus of the public debate generated by the attack was the legitimacy of the U.S. invocation of the inherent right of self-defense to launch a non -consensual operation within the sovereign territory of Pakistan. 6 However, that foc us soon shifted to another critical legal q uestion: even assuming the exercise of national self-defense was legitimate, what law regulated the tactical execution of the operationF By virtue of his role as the leader of al Qaeda, was O BL a lawful military objective within the meaning of the law of armed conflict (LOAC),8 and thereby subject to attack with deadly force as a measure of first resort? Or was he merely an international criminal, subject to a m uch more limited law enforcement use of force authori ty? The d uality of the jus belli issues im plicated by the attack generated a two-pronged legal critique: First, did the mission violate the international legal prohibition against use of force (jus ad bellutn)? Second, did the mission trigger the law of armed conflict, or was the amount of force employed during the mission resulting in OBL's death excessive to that which was necessary to apprehend him ? The self-defense targeting theory failed to sufficiently address this duality.
The first prong of this dualistic legal debate to uches on an issue that appears well-settled in U.S. practice: the use of military force to attack individuals who are determined to be al Qaeda o r Taliban belligerent operatives. The second pronghow such attacks are legally regulated at the tactical execution level-remains a subject of uncertainty. Bo th Presidents Bush and Obama (with the support of Congress) consistently invoked the inherent right of national self-defense pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations as the legal basis for attacking al Qaeda operatives. 9 However, the Obama administration seems to have superimposed an odd veneer on this authority: the concept of self-defense targeting. 1O Invoking the inherent right of self-defense, this theory suggests that both the resort to armed fo rce and the execution of specific operations are regulated by the jllS ad bellutn. In essence, because attacking terrorist targets falls within the scope of internatio nal self-defense legal authori ty, jus ad bellutn self-defense principles regulate the execution of combat operations used to achieve this self-defense objective, obviating the need to assess whether and what jus in bello principles apply to these o perations. Thus, so long as the targets fall within the ad bellutn principles of necessity and proportionality, attacking them is legally pennissible.
II. Background
There is nothing un usual about the assertion that the principles of necessity and proportionality regulate combat operations directed against transnational terrorist operatives. ll What is unusual is the assertion that jus ad bellum variants of these principles regulate operational execution.12 Necessity and p roportionality have always been core principles of both branches of the jus belli-principles that apply to both the authority to employ m ilitary force and the regulation of actual employment . However, in the jus ad bellum context, they have never before been viewed as principles to regulate operational and tactical execution. 13 Instead, in that context they frame the legality of national or multinational resort to m ilitary force in selfdefense. Once the decision is made to em ploy force pursuant to this authority, the jus in bello variant of these principles (necessity of the mission and proportionality of collateral damage) operate to regulate the application of combat power d uring mission execut ion (in other words, they provide the foundatio n fo r the regulation of the application of combat power in the context of the self-defense-justified mission).
This self-defense targeting paradigm-Professor Kenneth Anderson's " naked self-defense"I~-is certainly responsive to concerns over the legality of extending counterterror combat operations beyond the geographic limits of Afghanistan (and to an increasingly lesser degree Iraq). However, it does not and cannot become a substitute for defining the rules that regulate the actual execution of such missions. This ad bellum targeting theory may in some ways be responsive to the uncertainty related to the legal characterization of the struggle against transnational terrorism, o r perhaps more precisely the question of whether an armed conflict can exist within the meaning of international law when States employ armed force to find, fix and destroy terrorist operations in diverse geographic locations.15 A subcomponent of this question regarding the existence of an armed conflict is, even assuming the answer is yes, does such a conflict follow the enemy wherever on the globe he may be and does it provide for a "springing" of the LOAC authority for brief periods of time wherever he is located?
Since the United States initiated its m ilitary response to the terrorist attacks of September I I, 200 1, the uncertainty related to the legal nature of this response has been a central theme in policy and academic discourse. Although the answers to these questions seem increasingly settled in U.S. practice (at least in the practical if not legal sense), q uestions over the legality of killing OBL--or the availability of viable alternatives-have again highlighted the significance of this uncertainty. While the United States seems to have abandoned the assertion that it is in a "war" against terror that spans the entire globe, its continued attack of what can only be Blurring the Line between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello understood as targets of opportunity in places like Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan have kept this uncertainty at the forefront of contemporary debate on counterterror operations. 16 Various interpretations of what triggers the jus in bello emerged follow ing the U.S. military response to the terror attacks of September II. In general terms, these theories ranged across a spectrum from a strict adherence to the theretofore widely accepted internationaVinternal armed conflict paradigm, to the other extreme, proffered by me and others, that military operations conducted against international terrorist organizations like al Qaeda should be characterized as transnational armed confli cts: non-international armed conflicts of international scope. 17 Within that range were included concepts such as militarized law enforcement and extraterritorial law enforcement (military operations within the framework ofhuman rights principles). All of these approaches shared a common theme: they sought to define the rules of tactical execution applicable to this military response within a framework of established legal norms. 18 This essay will argue that the concept of self-defense targeting does not and cannot provide a substitute for resolving the debate about in bello applicability to transnational counterterror military operations. The reasons for this are multifaceted. First, the jus ad bellum has never been understood as a source of operational or tactical regulation nor a substitute for the law providing that regulation. 19 Indeed, one of the central tenets of the jus belli has always been the invalidity of reliance on the jus ad bellum to define jus in bello obligations. Instead, the de facto nature of tactical execution is the principal factor for assessing applicability of the jus in bello. Second, because the jus ad bellum has never been conceived as a tactical regulatory framework, using it as a substitute for the jus in bello injects unacceptable confusion into the planning and execution of combat operations. Finally, while the principles of necessity and proportionality are central to both branches of the jus belli, the meaning of these principles is not identical in each branch but, in fact, disparate. As a result, the scope of lawful authority to employ force during mission execution will be subtly but unquestionably degraded if ad bellum principles are utilized as a substitute for in bello regulation.
A. Transnational Armed Conflict: Genesis and Controversy Transnational anned conflict as a legal term of art was nonexistent prior to September II , 2001 . Other writings provide extensive explanation of the term's origins and the concept it proposed. 20 In essence, it was a concept intended to bridge the chasm between the two traditionally acknowledged-and ostensibly only-situations triggering the jus in bello: international or inter-State armed conflicts and non -international or internal armed conflicts. 21 Adopted in the 1949 revisions to the Geneva Conventions, the concept of armed conflict, and these two categories of armed conflict, manifested an effort to ensure a genuine de facto law-triggering standard. 22 While this did not eliminate all uncertainty as to when the law applies, preventing h umanitarian law avoidance through reliance on technical legal concepts such as war was unquestionably the primary motive behind the adoption of the armed conflict law trigger.
This was a profound development in conflict regulation. For the first time in history, a treaty-based legal test dictated applicability of LOAC regulation. 23 Although originally linked only to application of the Geneva Conventions, these triggers rapidly became the standard for applicability of the entire corpus of the LOAC. 24 An entire generation of military and international lawyers learned that armed conflict triggers LOAC application. 2s However, they also learned that there were only two types of armed conflict: international and internaP6
This dichotomy was under-inclusive from its inception. The international! internal armed conflict dichotomy was dearly responsive to the law avoidance that occurred during World War II and the law inapplicability during the Spanish Civil WarP However, it failed to account for the possibility of extraterritorial armed conflicts between States and non-State belligerents. 28 Although not a common situation in the history of modern warfare, hostilities in such a context were not unknown. 29 Nor did the armed-conflict-law trigger account for the emergence of other external military operations involving minimal hostilities, such as United Nations peacekeeping missions. JO Understanding the necessity of providing a regulatory framework for such operations, commanders and legal advisors thrust into these zones of uncertainty resorted to policy-based application of jus in bello principles, a methodology that proved generally effective in the decade preceding 9/1 l. l1 However, this approach to ftIling the regulatory void created by the international/internal dichotomy also averted attention from the underlying issue of regulatory under-ind usiveness. l2 This under-inclusiveness was fully exposed when the United States initiated its military response toal Qaeda following the terror attacks of September II }3 As the United States began to preventively detain captives in that struggle, the implicit invocation of LOAC authority became clear.
14 Use of the designation "unlawful combatant" confirmed this invocation-these terrorist operatives were detained not as criminals awaiting adjudication, but as enemy operatives to prevent their return to hostilities}S However, pursuant to the advice provided by his Attorney General, President Bush concluded that LOAC protections were inapplicable to these detainees.)6 The basis for this conclusion was d ear: the armed conflict with al Qaeda did not fit within the international/internal armed conflict law-triggering equation.l1 Because al Qaeda was not a State, the conflict could not qualify as Blurring the Line between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello international; because al Qaeda operated outside the territory of the United States, the conflict could not qualify as internal.l8
This determination was problematic on numerous levels, but for military lawyers trained to ensure compliance with LOAC principles during all military operations no matter how they might be legally classified,39 it was particularly troubling. As I have written previously, the concept of transnational armed conflict evolved to res pond to this newly exploited gap in legal protections for individuals subjected to LOAC-based authority.40 The objectives of the concept were simple: adopt a characterization for the non-international anned conflict with al Qaeda consistent with the non-State but nonetheless international character of the organization; require application offundamental LOAC principles; and deny al Qaeda any credibility windfall from suggesting the conflict was international within the meaning of the law. In short, it was simply a term to denote a non-international armed conflict (within the meaning of Common Article 3 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions) of international scope, what others have called an "internationalized non-international armed conflict."4l
Reaction to the transnational armed conflict concept has ranged the spectrum from rejection 42 to endorsement;H however, it is important to note that the underlying objective is also reflected in other conceptions of the legal framework for the military component of counterterror operations. As noted, these include "internationalized" non-international armed conflict and militarized extraterritorial law enforcement.44 For the United States, this debate was essentially resolved by the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 45 A majority of the Court concluded the tenn "non-international anned conflict" in Common Article 3 is not restricted to internal armed conflicts, but covers any armed conflict that does not qualify as international within the meaning of Common Article 2.46 This "co ntradistinction" interpretation effectively achieved the transnational armed conflict objective: a majority of the Court closed the gap identi fied (some might say exploited) by the Department of Justice analysis and relied on by President Bush. 47 By concluding that any armed conflict that fails to qualify as "international" within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions is non -international (irrespective of geographic scope) and therefore triggers the baseline humanitarian protections of Common Article 3, the Court created a simple equation: if the government treats the struggle against al Qaeda as an armed conflict, it must be either international or non -international within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions. 48 Thus, it closed the gap in humanitarian law applicability and ensured that future invocations of armed conflict authority must trigger minimum humanitarian obligations . .f9
The Hamdan opinion has not, however, eliminated the uncertainty and controversy over the legal characterization of military operations directed against al Qaeda. 50 Experts continue to struggle with this question, and new theories continue to emerge. 51 It remains indisputable, however, that characterizing the contention between al Qaeda and the United States as an armed conflict defies indicators traditionally applied to identify the existence of non-international armed conflicts.52 Those most notably lacking include a sustained nature of combat operations directed against al Qaeda targets outside the Afghanistan zone of combat 53 (even loosely defined ), and the lack of continuous and concerted hostilities by al Qaeda against the United States. 54 This lack of "intensity" and "duration" was in fact central to the conclusion by a working group of the International Law Commission that counterterror operations cannot be properly characterized as armed conflicts, even of the non-international type.55 Following President Obama's election, expectations were high that the new administration might abandon the armed conflict theory altogether and revert to the international law enforcement approach to dealing with the transnational terrorist threat. 56 Not only were these expectations unfounded; the new administration opened an entirely new front in the legal characterization debate.5' B. Self-defen se Targeting: A Third Rail? It did not take long for the Obama administration to demonstrate that it was not about to abandon an armed conflict-based approach to dealing with the al Qaeda threat.58 To this date, the United States continues to employ combat power against al Qaeda operatives in locations both proximate to and far removed from ongoing hostilities in Afghanistan. 59 These operations involve the employment of deadly force as a measure of first resort, an unavoidable indicator that the United States continues to rely on an armed conflict-based legal framework. 60 The discomfort with such an expansive concept of armed conflict is certainly understandable. What is equally understandable is the pragmatic reality that the nature of these operations makes them inconsistent with peacetime law enforcement legal principles. 61 Nonetheless, the apparent aversion to recognizing some type of "springing" armed conflict paradigm has produced not only opposition, but also a proposal for an alternative legal framework that avoids the need to address the conflict classification dilemma: self-defense targeting. 62 This alternative methodology is most notably attributed to Professor Kenneth Anderson. 63 In a series of essays, Anderson began to proffer the argwnent that the jus ad bellum provides sufficient-and ostensibly exclusive-legal authority for the regulation of attacks directed against terrorist operatives. 64 This theory has also been embraced by Professor Jordan Paust. 65 Although Paust has consistently rejected characterizing the response to transnational terrorism as an armed conflict66 (based primarily on a classical interpretation of Common Articles 2 and 3 of the Geneva Conventions)/,7 his position has evolved to acknowledge the legitimate use of military force in self-defense against external non -State threats.68 That response would not qualify as an armed conflict, because it could not fit within the traditionally understood scope of the Geneva Convention law-triggering framework. Instead, the jus ad bellum right of self-defense would be the exclusive source of legal authority related to the response.
Professor Anderson characterizes this theory as "naked self-defense."69 According to Anderson, this term characterizes the legal basis for drone strikes articulated by State Departmen t Legal Advisor Harold Koh: exercise of jus ad bellum selfdefense does not ipso facto trigger the jus in bello. As will be explained more fully be1ow, in the same essay Anderson signals a significant revision of this theory-a retreat motivated by his reflection on the inability to effectively define the geographic scope of a transnational non -international armed conflict. What issignificant here, however, is that the thcory itself presents a complex question: is it possible to employ military force pursuant to a claim of jus ad bellum national selfdefense without triggering the jus in bello? And if the answer is yes, what international legal principles regulate the application of combat power during the execution of such operations?
In this essay, I argue that jus ad bellum targeting-Qr naked self-defense-is a flawed substitute fo r embracing the alternate (albeit controversial) conclusion that employing combat power in self-de fense against transnational non-State operatives must be characterized as armed conflict. In support of this argument, the essay will expose what I believe is the implicit acknowledgment by proponents of self-defense targeting that these operations do indeed trigger the LOAC. I will do this by exploring the nature of two fundamen tal jus belli principles invoked by these proponents: necessity and proportionality.70 Contrasting the effect of these principles within the self-defense targeting framework with their effect within a jus in bello framework will illustrate that self-defense targeting reflects an implicit acknowledgment of jus in bello applicability during operational mission execution.
Ill. Th e Traditiona l Distinction between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello
At the core of the self-defense targeting theory is the assumption that the jus ad bellum provides sufficient authority to both justify and regulate the application of combat power.7 1 This assumption ignores an axiom of jus belli development: the compartmentalization of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.72 As Colonel G.I.A.D. Draper noted in 1971, "equal application of the Law governing the conduct of armed conflicts to those illegally resorting to armed forces and those lawfully resorting thereto is accepted as axiomatic in modern International Law. "73 This compartmentalization is the historic res ponse to the practice of definingjus in bello obligations by reference to the jus ad bellum legality of conflict. 74 As the jus in bello evolved to focus on the humanitarian protection of victims of war, to include the armed forces themselves,75 the practice of denying LOAC applicability based on assertions of conflict illegality became indefensible. 76 Instead, the de fac to nature of hostilities would dictate jus in bello applicability, and the jus ad bellum legal basis for hostilities would be irrelevant to this determination. 77 This compartmentalization lies at the core of the Geneva Convention lawtriggering equation.7 8 Adoption of the term "armed conflict" as the primary triggering consideration for jus in bello applicability was a deliberate response to the more formalistic jus i" bello applicability that predated the 1949 revision of the Geneva Conventions.19 Prior to these revisions, in bello applicability often turned on the existence of a state of war in the international legal sense, which in turn led to assertions of inapplicability as the result of assertions of unlawful aggression. SO Determined to prevent the denial of humanitarian regulation to situations necessitating such regulation-any de facto armed conflict-the 1949 Conventions sought to neutralize the impact of ad bellum legality in law applicability analysis. 81 This effort rapidly became the norm of internationallaw. 82 Armed conflict analysis simply did not include conflict legality considerations. 83 National military manuals, international jurisprudence and expert commentary all reflect this development. SoI This division is today a fundamental LOAC tenet-and is beyond dispute. 85 In fact, for many years the United States has gone even farther, extending application of LOAC principles beyond situations of armed conflict altogether so as to regulate any military operation. 86 This is just another manifestation of the fact that States, or perhaps more importantly the armed forces that do their bidding, view the cause or purported justification for such operations as irrelevant when deciding what rules apply to regulate operational and tactical execution.
This aspect of ad bellumlin bello compartmentalization is not called into question by the self-defense targeting concept.8' Nothing in the assertion that combat operations directed against transnational non-State belligerent groups qualifies as armed conflict suggests the inapplicability ofLOAC regulatory norms on the basis of the relative illegitimacy of al Qaeda'sefforts to inflict harm on the United States and other victim States (although as noted earlier, this was implicit in the original Bush administration approach to the war on terror).88 Instead, the self-defense targeting concept reflects an odd inversion of the concern that motivated the armed conflict law trigger. The concept does not assert the illegitimacy of the terrorist cause to deny LOAC principles to operations directed against them. 89 Instead, it
Blurring the Line between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello relies on the legality of the U.S. cause to dispense with the need for applying LOAC principles to regulate these operations. 90 This might not be explicit, but it is clear that an exclusive focus on ad bellum principles indicates that these principles subsume in bello conflict regulation norms.91
There are two fundamental flaws with this conflation. First, by contradicting the traditional compartmentalization between the two branches of the jus belli,92 it creates a dangerous precedent. Although there is no express resurrection of the just war concept ofLOAC applicability, by focusing exclusively on jus ad bellum legality and principles, the concept suggests the inapplicability of jus hi bello regulation as the result of the legality of the U.S. cause. To be clear, I believe U.S. counterterror operations are legally justified actions in self-defense. However, this should not be even implicitly relied on to deny jus in bello applicability to operations directed against terrorist opponents, precisely because it may be viewed as suggesting the invalidity of the opponent's cause deprives them of the protections of that law, or that the operations are somehow exempted from LOAC regulation. Second, even discounting this detrimental precedential effect, the conOation of ad bellum and in bello principles to regulate the execution of operations is extremely troubling.'B This is because the meaning of these principles is distinct within each branch of the
Furthermore, because the scope of authority derived from jus ad bellum principles purported1y invoked to regulate operational execution is more restrictive than that derived from their jus in bello counterparts,9S this conflation produces a potential windfall for terrorist operatives. Thus, the ad bellumJin bello conflation is ironically self-contradictory. In one sense, it suggests the inapplicability of jus in bello protections to the illegitimate terrorist enemy because of the legitimacy of the U.S. cause. 96 In another sense, the more restrictive nature of the jus ad bellum principles it substitutes for the jus in bello variants to regulate operational execution provides the enemy with increased protection from attack. 97 Neither of these consequences is beneficial, nor necessary. Instead, compliance with the traditional jus ad bellum/jus in bello compartmentalization methodology averts these consequences and offers a more rational approach to counterterrorism conflict regulation. 98
IV. Necessity and Proportionality: The Risk of Authority Dilution
The most problematic aspect of the self-defense targeting concept is that it produces a not so subtle substitution ofjllS ad bellum necessity and proportionality for the jus in bello variants of these principles. 99 While these principles are fundamental in both branches of the jus belli, 100 they are not identical in effect. The ad bellum variants are intended to limit State resort to force to a measure of last resort;IOI the in bello variants are intended to strike an appropriate balance between the authority to efficiently bring about the submission of an enemy and the humanitarian interest of limiting the inevitable suffering associated with armed conflict. 102 It is a fo undational principle of international law that the jus ad bellum restricts resort to force by States to situations of absolute necessity-and necessity justifies only proportional force to return the status quo ante.
103 In this sense, national self-defense is strikingly analogous to individual self-defense as a criminal law justification. H14 In both contexts, necessity requires a determination of an imminent threat of unlawful attack, a situation affording no alternative other than selfhelp measures. lOS Furthennore, even when the justification of self-help is triggered by an imminent threat, both bodies of law strictly limit the amount offorce that may be employed to respond to the threat.l06 States, like individuals, may use only that amount of force absolutely necessary to meet the threat and restore the status quo ante of security. to? Using more force than is necessary to subdue the threat is considered excessive, and therefore outside the realm of the legally justified response.108
There is no question that these variants of necessity and proportionality are critical to the stability of international relations. 109 The UN Charter reflects an obvious judgment that States are obligated to endeavor to resolve all disputes peacefully, and that resort to force must be conceived as an exceptional measure. 110 A very limited conception of necessity requiring an actual and imminent threat of unlawful aggression selVes this purpose by prioritizing alternate dispute resolution modalities over uses offorce-the core purpose of the Charter. III Even after a justifiable resort to fo rce, the requirement to provide notice to the Security Councll l12 reflects this purpose by enhancing the probability of Security Council action to restore international peace and security and thereby nullify the necessity for continued use of force by the State. lu The jus ad bellum proportionality rule also selVes this purpose by reducing the risk of uncontrollable escalation. 114 By limiting the justified response to only that amount of force absolutely necessary to reduce the threat, proportionality operates to mitigate the risk of a justified self-defense response morphing into an unjustified use of military force to achieve objectives unrelated to self-defense. lIS As a result, conflagration is limited, thereby enhancing the efficacy of alternate dispute resolution modalities.
These principles make perfect sense when assessing the justification for a national resort to military force outside the umbrella of a Security Council authorization. However, as operational execution parameters, they impose a peacetime selfdefense model onto wartime employment of combat power. This is because the jus in bello variants of necessity and proportionality have never been understood to Blurring the Line between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello function analogously with their peacetime variants.1I6 Instead, these principles have unique meaning in the context of armed conflict.117 As a result, they are simply not interchangeable with the ad bellum variants. As a result, the self-defense targeting concept ostensibly regulates the execution of combat operations with norms inconsistent with those historically and logically suited for that purpose.
Jus in bello necessity means something fundamentally different than self-defense necessity.118 In the context of armed conflict, necessity justifies a much broader exercise of authority-the authority to employ all measures not otherwise prohibited by international law to bring about the prompt submission of the enemy. 119 Unlike self-defense necessity, there is no "measure oflast resort" aspect to jus in bello necessity.12o Accordingly, armed conflict triggers authority to employ force in a manner that would rarely (if ever) be tolerated in peacetime, even when acting in self-defense. 121
The most obvious (and relevant for purposes of this essay) illustration of the difference between ad bellum and in bello necessity is the authority to employ deadly force against an opponent. Like peacetime self-defense, jus ad bellum self-defense Because armed conflict involves a contest between armed belligerent groups, and not merely individual actors, the use of force authority triggered by military necessity is focused on collective rather than individual effect. l29 In other words, unlike a peacetime exercise of necessity (which focuses on neutralizing an individual threat), wartime l30 necessity focuses on bringing about the submission of the enemy in the corporate and not individual sense.])1 This collective vice individual focus of justifiable violence applies at every level of military operations. At the strategic level, nations seek to break the will of an opponent by demonstrating to Geoffrey S. Com enemy leadership the futility of resistance; at the operational level, commanders seek to impose their will on forces arrayed against them by the synchronized employment of all combat capabilities.132 The ideal outcome of such employment is the establishment offull-spectrum dominance, allowing the friendly commander to impose his will on the enemy at the time and place of his choosing. m This routinely necessitates use of overwhelming combat power at the decisive point in the battle--use that is often far more robust than may be required to overcome resistance at that specific point. l :J4 At the tactical level, forces may use mass and shock to paralyze enem y forces, disrupt their ability to maneuver and adjust to the fluidity of the battle, and demoralize individual unit members. us All of these effects contribute to "the prompt submission of the enemy."I)!;
Employing overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time of battle (known as the principle of mass in the lexicon of military doctrine)l 31 would arguably be inconsistent with jus ad bellum necessity.OS Instead, a commander would be restricted from employing any amount offorce beyond what was actually necessary to subdue the individual object of attack. 139 Thus, the assertion that the jus ad bellum suffices to justify necessary measures to subdue an opponent misses the point. The question is not whether the resort to force by the State is necessary-a question that certainly must be answered through the lens of jus ad bellum necessity.14o The question is whether the amount of force then employed by the armed forces of the State to subdue the enemy is justified, a question that must be answered through the lens of a vel)' different conception of necessity.141
Even more problematic than the extension of jus ad bellum necessity as an operational regulatory norm is the extension of jus ad bellum proportionality. Like necessity, proportionality is a core principle of both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. 14 2 And like necessity, the principle has a significantly different meaning in each branch of the jus belli. 143 Conflating these disparate principles into a singular regulatol)' norm substantially degrades the scope oflawful targeting authority and confuses those charged with executing combat operations.
In the jus ad bellum, proportionality really means proportionality. This might seem like an odd statement, but it is critical when comparing the two jus belli variants of the principle. Proportionality normally means no more than is absolutely necessary to achieve a valid purpose. 144 It is a concept that is normally linked to a justification of necessity. 145 Similarly, under U.S. criminal law, actions in self-defense are invalid if executed with more force than is necessary to reduce the threat. Use of excessive force in that context, because not strictly necessary, is unjustified. 146
The jus ad bellum reflects an analogous conception of proportionality .147 First, the amount of force a State is permitted to employ in self-defense is strictly limited to that amount necessary to reduce the imminent threat.148 Second, the source of Blurring the Line between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello aggression is the beneficiary of the proportionality constraint. 149 In other words, as in the criminal law context, a State (like an individual) responding to unlawful aggression may be authorized to employ force in self-defense, but is prohibited from responding to the source of aggression with any amount of force in excess of that necessary to reduce that immediate threat.
In contrast, proportionality in the jus in bello context does not really mean proportionality. Again, this may seem like an odd proposition. Nonetheless, even a cursory review of the jus in hello proportionality principle validates this conclusion. First, unlike traditional proportionality, the jus in hello variant in no way protC<ts the object of deliberate violence (the lawful target). Instead, the beneficiaries of the protection are the knowing but non-deliberate victims of a deliberate attackcivilians and civilian property in proximity to the lawful target. lSO Protecting these potential victims from what is referred to in colloquial terms as collateral damage and incidental injury reflects a fundamentally different purpose for this proportionality constraint. Unlike in the self-defense context, jus in bello proportionality is not directly linked to the necessity of subduing an imminent threat. Instead, the objective of the principle is to protect innocent people and property in the vicinity of a lawful object of attack from the consequences of employing combat power against lawful targets. As for the lawful target itself, the suggestion that an attack might be disproportionate is a legal oxymoron; the status alone justifies that amount of force determined necessary to bring about enemy submission, which justifies use of deadly force as a measure of first resort. 151 The only limitation on that use of force is the prohibition against the use of methods (tactics) or means (weapons ) calculated or of a nature to cause superfl uous injury or unnecessary suffering. However, this rule is not synonymous with the protections provided by the principle of proportionality, and rarely is considered a limitation on the employment of authorized weapon systems against enemy personnel, facilities or equipment.
Second, beneficiaries of jus in bello proportionality (potential victims of collateral damage and incidental injury) are not protected from disproportionate effects, but from excessive effects. IS! An attack is unlawful within the meaning of jus in bello proportionality only when the knowing but non-deliberate harm will be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. While the principle, like its ad bellum counterpart, does trigger a balance of interests, the fulcrum upon which that balance is made is fundamentally different. Excessive is not, nor ever has been, analogous to disproportionate. ls3 To begin with, the meaning of the word is far more elusive than that of traditional proportionality. Proportionality connotes something slightly more than necessary to produce an outcome. While this is not a precise concept, it lends itself to objective evaluation. Indeed, juries sitting in judgment of defendants claiming the justifi cation of self-defense routinely critique the amount of force employed by the defendant, asking whether it was more than necessary to respond to the threat.
Excessive, in contrast, connotes a significant imbalance. While the precise meaning of excessive collateral damage or incidental injury remains nearly as elusive today as it was when the concept was incorporated into Additional Protocol I, ISo! one thing is dear: it is not analogous to disproportionate harm as the term is used in relation to traditional proportionality analysis. Instead, it means something more analogous to harm so overwhelming that it actually nullifies the legitimacy of attacking an othernrise lawful target. Thus, the jus in bello proportionality principle does not obligate commanders to strictly limit the amount of fo rce employed against a lawful target to the absolute minimum necessary to eliminate a threat. Instead, it obligates the commander to cancel an attack only when the anticipated harm to civilians andJor civilian property is so beyond the realm of reason that infli cting that harm, even incidentally, reflects a total disregard fo r the innocent victims of hostilities. ISS In this sense, it is almost as if the law imputes an illicit state of mind to a commander because of the disregard of the risk of overwhelming harm to the civilian population . lS6
This jus in bello variant of proportionality is further distinguished from its ad bellum counterpart because of the nature of operational and tactical targeting. In a traditional self-defense context, the employment of force (individually or nationally) is justified for the sole purpose of eliminating the imminent threat. In armed conflict, the potential effect to be achieved by employing combat power against a lawful target often varies depending on mission requirements. Accordingly, elimination of an individual threat is not the unitary objective offorce employment. Instead, commanders leverage their combat power to achieve defin ed effects against the range of enemy targets in the battlespace, effects that collectively facilitate enemy submission.ls7 Destruction is obviously one of these effects. However, doctrinal effects also include disruption, degradation, interdiction, suppression and harassment.lss Each of these effects requires a different type and amount of fo rce to achieve; and each effect therefore implicates a very different proportionality analysis.
This variable nature of justifiable effects in anned conflict-known in operational terms as "effects-based operations"159-is a critical factor in applying the jus in bello proportionality principle, and finds no analogue in self-defense targeting.
Nations employ force to reduce the threat, and only that amount offorce required to do so is justified . Accordingly, if disruption alone is sufficient to restore the nonthreat environment, the jus ad bellum obligates the State to employ force limited in intensity to achieve this effect. However, no analogous minimum necessary force
Blurring the Line between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello obligation exists pursuant to the jus in bello proportionality principle. Instead, each employment of force is operationally connected to the broader overall objective of compelling enemy submission. Thus, disruption and bypass of enemy fo rces may be a selected course of action at one point in the battle, while total destruction may be selected for a similar enemy force at another point in the battle. Obviously, these different selected effects will drive the amount of force employment required, which will in turn influence the risk of collateral damage and incidental injUll'. Furthermore, under the ad bellum construct, proportionality is traditionally assessed at the strategic (macro) level. 160 The importance of this aspect of jus in bello proportionality is reflected in the requirement that the consequences of force employment be assessed against the overall operational objective, and not the individual tactical objective. A number of States included this macro conception of proportionality in understandings when they ratified Additional Protocol I. 161 The motivation to enter such reservations seems obvious: attribution of the value of employing combat power in armed conflict for purposes of balancing the anticipated effects of that employment against collateral damage and incidental injury must be framed by the broader concept of how it contributes to the legitimate operational objective of compelling enemy submission, not through a micro assessment of whether it is sufficient to achieve any given and isolated tactical objective. This aspect of jus in bello proportionality once again reflects the most fundamental difference between the two variants of the principle: the beneficiary of the protection is not the object of attack.
Collectively, all of these considerations indicate that extending jus ad bellum proportionality to jus in bello decision making produces at worst a significant distortion oflegitimate operational authority, and at best confusion as to the scope of targeting authority. Are forces executing jus ad bellum self-defense missions obligated to employ minim um force to subdue the object of attack? Is the object of attack protected by the principle? Must proportionality be assessed based on an exclusive consideration of reducing the threat presented by the immediate object of attack, or may the broader impact on enemy fo rces be considered? These questions are nullified by maintaining the traditional division between jus ad bellum authority and jus in bello regulation. Pursuant to this division, the nation acts in response to an actual or imminent threat and the armed forces executing operations pursuant to that justificatiml employ force in order to bring about the prompt submission of the enemy entity posing the threat. In so doing, they balance the risk of collateral damage and incidental injury to civilians and civilian property in the vicinity of enemy objects of attack. But nothing obligates them to employ the minimum amount of force to achieve each individual tactical objective.
v. If It Ain't Broke Don't Fix It: Jus in Bello Principles and Tactical Clarity
As noted earlier in this essay, some commentators continue to assert the inapplicability of jus in bello principles to the struggle against transnational terrorism on the basis that this struggle cannot qualify as armed conflict, or that if it does it is geographically restricted to zones of traditional combat operations. 162 Some of these commentators also reject the legitimacy of invoking jus ad bellum self-de fense to attack terrorists. This rejection at least renders their position logically consistent. The same cannot be said for advocates of self-defense targeting: those who assert the legitimacy ofinvoking the right of national self-defense to respond to the threat of transnational terrorism, but insist such operations cannot normally qualify as armed conflicts triggering the jus in bello. 163 If, as they assert, responding to terrorism with military force is justified pursuant to the jus ad bellum, then the use of combat capability to execute such missions is, in the view of this author and others, sufficient to qualify as armed conflict. Why is there such aversion to acknowledging jus in bello applicability to military operations executed to achieve these legitimate self-defense objectives? The most obvious answer appears to be the conclusion that these operations, while justified as actions in self-defense, fail to satisfy the internationally accepted elements to qualify as armed conflicts. This self-defense-without-armed-conflict approach reflects a visceral discomfort with the suggestion that States may properly invoke jus in bello authority whenever they choose to employ combat power abroad. Transnational armed conflict opponents argue that since the inception of the "Global War on Terror,» unless combat operations fit within the traditional Geneva Convention internationaV internal armed conflict equation, they cannot be characterized as armed conllicts. 16S Others (including the author) have responded to this argument at length in previous articles. 166 However, what is perplexing is that this argument loses all merit when connected with the self-defense targeting theory. That theory presupposes the use of combat power to defend the nation against an imminent and ongoing threat posed by transnational terrorist operatives.
If this is the basis for refusing to acknowledge the applicab ility of jus in bello regulatio n, it is the ultimate manifestation of willful blindn ess. Essentially, selfdefense targeting proponents implicitly acknowledge operations conducted under this authority involve anned hostilities against transnational non-State threats. However, they then avoid assessing the nat ure of these hostilities, and how they implicate jus in bello applicability, by substituting ad bellum principles to provide a regulatory framework for operational execution.167
Professor Kenneth Anderson's latest essay on this subject is particularly insightful on the validity of the self-defense targeting concept. l68 An (or perhaps the) original proponent of self-defense targeting,l69 Anderson candidly acknowledges his reversal on this issue, and that what he calls "naked self-defense" is insufficient to provide comprehensive regulation to transnational counterterroroperations. 170 This is an important step in the right direction, for it will better focus debate on the underlying and critical question of whether a nation's resort to force in self-defense against an external non-State opponent can qualify as something other than armed conflict. My response to this question has been consistent: when a State employs combat power in a manner that indicates it has implicitly invoked LOAC principles (by employing deadly force as a measure of first resort), it is engaged in an armed conflict. As a reswt, it is bound to comply with core LOAC principles. 111 This does not mean that any use of armed forces qualifies as armed conflict. Such a view would certainly be overbroad, and I have argued against this approach consistently in the past. However, when armed forces employed to achieve a national security objective conduct operations pursuant to LOAC-based targeting authority-statusbased targeting-that combination of armed forces and engagement authority indicates they are utilizing the "tools" of war, and must respect, at a minimum, the core principles of the "rwes" of war. 172 Irrespective of the relative support for or opposition to this interpretation of LOAC applicability, it remains a critical question that has been obscured by the self-defense targeting alternative. If, as propo nents like Professor Paust argue, an exercise of national self-defense against transnational non-State threats is not armed conflict, focus must be redirected to determine the alternative controlling legal framework for regwating the execution of such operations. Can national selfdefense be executed with an employment of military (or paramilitary) force falling below the threshold of armed conflict? For example, are there situations where a State when asserting the right of national self-defense is obligated by the jus ad bellum proportionality requirement to rely on police powers instead of combat power?
This seems a particularly critical question in an era of transnational non-State threats. Terrorism is obviously first on that list (at least for the United States), but organized criminal syndicates operating across national boundaries, piracy and non-State-generated cyber threats all share similarities with transnational terrorism. All of these threats challenge the national security of multiple States; all of these threats emanate from entities that are rarely organized in traditional military character; all of these threats may compe1 reliance on military force in response. Yet in the view of many, the lack of organization, territorial control and concerted military-type operations by these threats exclude responses (even with military force ) from the category of armed conflict. m Invoking the jus ad bellum as a justification to respond to such threats is insufficient to resolve this important question. Instead, resolving this question requires a careful assessment of the nature of the threat, the nature of the requisite res ponse and the very real consequences of subjecting operational execution to either a law enforcement or armed conflict legal framework. Some experts (the author included) continue to believe that LOAC principles provide an effective and operationally logical framework to regulate any combat operation . But as noted above, this view is based on the conclusion that the key trigger for application of these principles is a use of force that reflects reliance on the principle of military objective. In those situations, there is arguably no value-and indeed substantial riskin attempting to substitute jus ad bellum principles to regulate operational execution. However, there are plausible arguments that the nature of some self-defense missions might justify a more restrictive operational framework based on a hybrid of LOAC and law enforceme nt p rinciples.1 7~ What seems clear, however, is that even if true, these principles would be applied as the result of the nature of the threat/response continuum, not as an extension of jus ad bellum principles to regulate operational execution.
VI. One Step Forward, One Step Back: A re We Missing Something?
The statement by Legal Advisor Koh following the Bin Laden raid addressing U.S. legal authority for the mission and for killing Bin Laden is perhaps as clear an articulation of a legal basis for a military action ever provided by the Department of State. 17S Indeed, the fact that Koh articulated an official U.S. interpretation of both the jus ad bellum and jus in bello makes his use of a website titled Opinio /uris 176 especially significant (as such a statement by a government official in Koh's position is clear evidence of opinio juris). Unlike his earlier statement at a meeting of the American Society of International Law, m Koh did not restrict his invocation of law to the jus ad bellum. Instead, he asserted the U.S. position that the mission was justified purs uant to the inherent right of self-defense, but also that Bin Laden's killing was lawful pursuant to the jus in bello. Koh properly noted that as a mission executed in the context of the armed conflict with al Qaeda, the LOAC imposed no obligation on U.S. fo rces to employ minimum necessary force. Instead, Bin Laden's status as an enemy belligerent justified the use of deadly force as a measure of first resort, and Bin Laden bore the burden of manifesting his surrender in order to terminate that authority. Hence, U.S. forces were in no way obligated to attempt to capture Bin Laden before resorting to deadly forceYs A recent statement made by lohn Brennan, Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, further clarifies the current administration's justification for using deadly fo rce as a first resort against al Qaeda operatives:
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The United States does not view our authority to use military fo rce against al-Qa'ida as being restricted solely to ~hot" battlefields like Afghanistan. Because we are engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qa'ida, the United States takes the legal position that . . . we have the authority to take action against al-Qa'ida and its associated forces without doing a separate self-defense analysis each time .... This Administration's counterterrorism efforts outside of Afghanistan and Iraq are focused on those individuals who are a th reat to the United States, whose removal would cause a significant--even if only temporary--disruption of the plans and capabilities of al-Qa'ida and its associated fo rces. Practically speaking, then, the question turns principally on how you defme "imminence."
We are finding increasing recognition in the international community that a more flexible understanding of~imminence" may be appropriate when dealing with te rrorist groups, in part because threats posed by non-state actors do not present themselves in the ways that evidenced imminence in more traditional conflicts . . . . Over time, an increasing number of our international counterterrorism partners have begun to recognize that the traditional conception of what constitutes an "imminent" attack should be broadened in light of the modem-day capabilities, techniques, and technological innovations of te rrorist organizations. l79 These two articulations of the Obama administration's interpretation of intem ationallaw reflect an important evolution of the U.S. legal framework for military operat ions directed against transnational terrorist operatives. They leave virtually no doubt that the United States has embraced the concept oftransnational armed conflict, that the nation is engaged in an armed conflict against al Qaeda, that this armed conflict is non-international within the meaning of the jus in bello and that it transcends national borders. There is also no doubt that the United States invoked the jus in bello as the framework to regulate execution of the Bin Laden m ission. Koh's clear emphasis on the in bello variants of the principles of distinction and proportionality cannot be read as meaning anything else.
Koh, however, included o ne q ualifier that suggests possible uncertainty. Rejecting the cr iticism that attacks such as that on Bin Laden are unlawful extrajudicial killings, Koh noted that "a state that is engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is no t required to provide targets with legal process before the state may use lethal force."I80What is perplexing is the "or" in the statem ent. Koh preserved a division between armed conflict and other actio ns in legitimate selfdefense. It is significant that he asserts the right to kill as a m easure of firs t resort in either context (which seems to rebut any inference that he is suggesting some actions in self-defense must be exercised pursuant to a law enforcement legal Geoffrey S. Com framework). Why was that "or" necessary? What was Koh suggesting if he was not suggesting a law enforcem ent limitation to some actions in self-defense?
One possible answer is that Advisor Koh is simply preserving the authority of the United States to act in limited self-defense against an imminent terrorist threat that is not considered associated with al Qaeda or the Taliban. In such situations, the attack would accordingly be unrelated to the existing armed conflict the United States asserts is ongoing with these enemies. If this was the m eaning of his use of the "or," it produces little confusion: imminent terrorist threats to the United States may justify military action as an exercise of jus ad bellum self-d efense, and usc of force for such a purpose triggers LOAC applicability. However, distinguishing armed conflict from self-defense with an "or" could also be interpreted as an endorsement of self-d efense targeting, suggesting that uses of military force are regulated by the jus in bello or jus ad bellum principles. This is an unnecessary dichotomy, and hopefully one that Advisor Koh did not intend. There is no viable reason to attempt to establish such a distinction; as discussed in this essay, the suggestion that ad bellum principles are interchangeable with their in bello variants is flawed and operationally confusing. 181
VII. Conclusion
Transnational non-State threats are not going away any time soon. Indeed, it is likely that identifying a rational and credible legal basis for natio nal response to such threats will continue to vex policymakers and legal advisors in the coming years. These threats will almost certainly lead States to continue to invoke the inherent right of national andior collective self-defense to justify extraterritorial responses. This legal basis is not, however, an adequate substitute for defining the legal fram ework to regulate the operational exercise of this self-defense authority. Nonetheless, the adven t ofthe self-defense targeting theory purports to be just that.
The jus ad bellum was never conceived as a legal framework to regulate the execution of military operations. Instead, it is analogous to the law that permits individuals to act in self-defense when faced with an imminent threat of death or grievous bodily harm. Like the domestic self-defense concept, jus ad bellum selfdefense reflects a necessity foundation based on minimizing situations where States resort to force and limiting the risk of conflagration resulting from such resort. Self-d efense, as a form of self-help, is intended to be a measure of last resort, and the jus ad bellum principles of necessity and proportionality reflect that foundation. In contrast, the jus in bello variants of these two principles are based on a fundamentally different foundation: facilitating the prom pt submission of operational opponents in the collective-not individual-sense. Accordingly, the scope Blurring the Line between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello of permissible violence justified by the jus in bello is fundamen tally different from that tolerated through the exercise of peacetime self-defense.
Attempting to substitute jus ad bellum principles fo r their jus in bello variants is not only confusing; it fundamentally degrades target engagement authority. As discussed in this essay, this degradation is the result of imposing peacetime concepts on wartime operations. It may be conceivable that some actions in selfdefense--especiaUy in response to non-State threats-may permit only a law enforcement-type response. For example, if members of Mexican drug cartels began engaging in violence on the U.S. side of the border requiring, in the judgment of the President, some action to neutralize this threat, armed forces might be used to augment law enforcement officers during a mission to capture cartel members for subsequent trial. In such a situation, the use of armed force might be subject to law enforcement-type use of force authority. However, even if such situations are conceptually lodged within the scope of national self-defense authority, this cannot justify the wholesale abandonment of jus in bello principles. Instead, the nature of the threat and the authority invoked by the State to respond to that threat must dictate the existence of armed conflict. When States utilize armed forces and grant them the authority to engage opponents pursuant to the LOAC rule of military objective-an invocation revealed by the employment of deadly force as a measure of first resort-it indicates the existence of an armed conflict. 
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